Site by Bennett Web & Design Co.
Journal of the North Atlantic
C. Müller-Boysen
2017 Special Volume 8
210
Introduction
Nowadays, no one blinks an eye when economic
policy is executed. Every day, all over the world, one
government or another passes laws, imposes taxes,
collects customs and excise, doles out subsidies,
and raises or lowers interest rates in order to nudge
the money supply or correct inflationary tendencies.
A number of these instruments of economic policy
have been around for some time, so that we can trace
their roots back to the Middle Ages. During this
period, self-help measures by persons and institutions
involved in trade life, which should ensure the
economic success of trade and transport, played a
greater role alongside government measures. In particular,
more or less informal associations, founded
by merchants for their mutual protection or for the
enjoyment of rights held in common, were important
factors in maintaining an environment in which
trade could flourish.
If we travel back in mind to the Early Middle
Ages, we find ourselves in an era in which the
nascent state was only beginning to build up the
institutional matrix that would enable it to formulate
and execute economic policy. Nonetheless, at the
moment when, around 800 A.D., Northern Europe
first appeared on the radar screens of continental
chroniclers, it becomes evident that it already constituted
an economy that—aside from the depredations
of the Scandinavians, which gave the era its
title “Age of the Vikings”—was characterized by
substantial foreign trade. Thus, the question arises as
to whether these commercial activities were fostered
by political measures undertaken by territorial lords.
Equally, one wonders whether Northern European
merchants created their own institutional matrix to
ensure their own security and profits, or whether
they adapted pre-existing institutions to the task.
Let me first of all set out what I mean by “early
medieval trade in Northern Europe”. The time frame
is easy to determine: it runs from the beginning of
the Age of the Vikings, often dated from the plundering
of Lindisfarne in 793,1 to the origins and growth
of the Hanse in the 12th–14th centuries. Geographically,
early medieval Northern European trade encompassed
an immense area. From Greenland in the
far northwest, it extended over the North Atlantic
islands, Ireland, and England to Scandinavia, and
from there eastwards to Novgorod (ON hólmgarðr)
and south to Constantinople (ON mikligarðr). Goods
whose origins lay north of the Polar Circle were
traded alongside merchandise from the Rhineland.
Seafaring merchants (ON farmenn) played a central
role in the long-distance trade of the era. They
were unquestionably a footloose lot, sailing the high
seas of Northern Europe with very little interference
from the state, which in any event scarcely can be
said to have existed, and concluding lucrative deals
with their merchandise, while not being unalterably
adverse to pillage, if need be (Müller-Boysen
1987:254–257). Since these far-flung activities
physically removed them from their clans, they were
on their own when trading. The farther afield they
strayed, the more urgently they needed effective
protection of life and goods.
Early medieval Northern Europe was a dangerous
place for a lonely travelling merchant transporting
expensive merchandise. Thieves and pirates
cast a covetous eye on his goods. If a merchant’s
ship was wrecked, he had to reckon not only with
the loss of his merchandise and vessel, but also—
should he manage to reach dry land—with being
bludgeoned to death or sold into slavery, even in
peacetime. Armed conflict raised the ante: previously
impregnable trading centers proved quite
unable to guarantee a merchant’s personal safety or
protect his goods.
No foreign merchant arriving in a strange place
could be certain of enjoying legal protection. Even
if this were the case, that did not mean that he was
on an equal footing with the natives in legal actions.
Even if the law was on his side, he stood alone in
Factors for the Protection of Merchants in Early Medieval Northern Europe
Carsten Müller-Boysen* (Translated by Stuart Jenks)
Abstract - The very first historical sources which shed light on economic life in early medieval Scandinavia demonstrate
that measures were being taken in order to provide for the security of trade. Merchants themselves made efforts to develop
cooperative forms of organization designed to provide the greatest possible protection for life and goods when they were on
the move. Kings and other territorial lords were also interested in removing threats to merchants and markets within their
dominions, particularly since vigorous trade meant higher tax income for them. Early medieval Northern Europe witnessed
the execution of economic policies designed to succor trade and direct it in orderly channels.
Debating the Thing in the North: The Assembly Project II
Journal of the North Atlantic
*Landesarchiv Schleswig-Holstein, Prinzenpalais, D-24837 Schleswig, Germany; Carsten.Mueller-Boysen@la.landsh.de.
2017 Special Volume 8:210–215
Journal of the North Atlantic
C. Müller-Boysen
2017 Special Volume 8
211
court, lacking oath-helpers who, had he been at
home, would have been drawn from his clan and
whose statements under oath were essential to back
up his word and win the case. Hence, the foreign
merchant was at a disadvantage in court, irrespective
of whether he had to defend himself against a
charge or demand compensation for a crime against
his person or his goods. Worse yet, if he was unlucky
enough to die in a strange place, his property was
lost to his heirs. And if he had been the victim of
homicide, there was no one with the legal standing
to demand compensation for his death.
In view of the daunting variety of risks to which a
foreign merchant was exposed, it becomes apparent
that effective protection had two aspects:
1. On the one hand, a merchant had need of
physical protection against violence directed
at his life or his property.
2. On the other hand, he needed legal protection,
which would guarantee the inviolability
of his person and his goods and punish those
who attacked or robbed him. Moreover, he required
a recognized legal standing when venturing
abroad, one that would enable him to
prosecute his claims in foreign courts. Building
a legal framework for commerce also
meant increased security for all merchants.
Creating a legal framework for the security of
merchants and merchandise in a region such as early
medieval Northern Europe—where monarchies
were still struggling merely to exist and were far
removed from being able to effectively deal with
the problem of security and order—meant that those
active in commerce were left to their own devices,
so that self-defense loomed large. Merchants soon
realized that mutual self-protection in more or less
formal associations was the best way to ward off the
myriad risks of their profession and provide for their
common security.
Associations and Partnerships
Whenever merchants came on board a ship in
which they intended to sail to far-off markets, they
founded a sworn association for the duration of the
voyage. Within the purview of this cooperative, they
fulfilled two functions that were derived from the
traditions of maritime law in Northern European
legal systems. Since they accompanied their goods
on the voyage, they were not only freighters, but also
members of the crew, with all the rights and duties
accompanying that status. The general obligation
of all passengers on a ship to take an active part in
defending the vessel if it came under attack lent the
sworn association of merchants on board the character
of a mutual defense organization (Slesvig Stadsret
§ 57, 58; Magnus Hakonarsons By-Lov IX:§ 7;
Jónsbók IX:§ 9).2
Commercial partnerships constituted a second,
separate, and very common form of self-protection.
These were founded as a joint-stock partnership
between the parties (ON félag). The defense aspect
of the partnership came to the fore if and when one
partner died. In that case, the merchandise owned
by the partnership was not forfeit to the crown or
land-owner, since ownership was invested in the
other partner because the partnership’s capital was
held in common (Magnus Hakonarsons By-Lov IX,
§ 22). The surviving partner could lay full claim to
the firm’s merchandise and transport it back home,
thus securing the deceased’s share for his heirs, as
numerous examples demonstrate (Vápnfirðinga saga
chapter 4:31). Had the deceased been done to death
by violence, his partner was legally in a position to
demand compensation for the crime from the culprits
(Grágás § 97), thus providing the heirs of his
deceased partner with an indemnification for the loss
of their relative.
Commercial partnerships were not uncommonly
comprised of a sleeping partner, who provided the
capital, but stayed at home, and an active partner,
who provided no capital, but invested his labor, accompanying
the firm’s merchandise to market. The
defense aspect of these partnerships lay in the fact
that it gave the sleeping partner an opportunity to
diversify his investments, putting his capital into
a number of partnerships. This reduced the risk of
loss, just as was the case with ships owned by several
partners in common (Konungs skuggsjá 14).
Guilds
In contradistinction to commercial partnerships,
which were generally entered into only for the duration
of a single voyage, guilds (ON gildi) were
associations for life, in which the economic aspects
were kept in the background and the sworn obligation
to assist and defend one’s brother members
was decisive (Anz 1998, Bisgaard and Søndergaard
2002, Müller-Boysen 1990:66–81). This aspect was
so paramount that the oath was solemnly repeated
each year at the guild’s feast. On the one hand,
the guilds fulfilled a deterrence function in that
no insult, much less a crime committed against a
brother member of the guild could be tolerated, and
all members were duty bound to avenge it. On the
other hand, there was a host of duties to assist one
another. Thus, if a member became endangered or
suffered economic loss (e.g., in the case of loss of
merchandise or an emergency at sea), his fellow
members were required to assist him. Moreover,
Journal of the North Atlantic
C. Müller-Boysen
2017 Special Volume 8
212
membership in the guild enhanced the legal position
of each of its members in court, since they could
count on their brother members to be their oathhelpers
(Müller-Boysen 1990:66–81). In addition,
conflicts between guild members were ironed out
internally, which was undoubtedly advantageous
(Anz 2002:24–25). It was precisely the functions of
deterrence, assistance, and legal support that made
guilds attractive for merchants, since whenever they
journeyed abroad, they had, of necessity, physically
to remove themselves from the security net provided
by family and friends at home. Since the guild was
an artificial clan, which one joined of one’s own free
will and which provided the active support of a clan
irrespective of where the individual was at the moment,
it provided a powerful shield for long-distance
merchants. It is difficult to state with any confidence
where and when Scandinavian guilds originated, but
there can be no doubt that by the second half of the
11th century they were well established (cf. Bugge
1913:132, Christensen 1966:160, Müller-Boysen
1990:81, Seip 1960:320).
Protective Measures
Not only were journeys to far-off markets hazardous
for long-distrance merchants, but so were
day-to-day dealings in the market place. Simply put,
not all commercial disputes were settled peacefully.
There were more than enough traders who were
prepared to use violence to secure their commercial
interests, so that a merchant’s life and property
were constantly exposed to considerable danger (cf.
Müller-Boysen 1987:254-257). If no third party
could guarantee that commercial dealings would
remain peaceful and enforce that guarantee, then
those engaged in trade could at least agree to keep
the peace among themselves, thus providing mutual
security (Lehmann 1893). Those present in the market
place committed themselves to maintaining the
peace among one another, at least as long as trading
was going on. In the Nordic world, there existed a
corresponding formal peace agreement (ON grið),
in which those present in a particular place pledged
to one another that they would forswear violence for
a stated period of time (cf. Bøe, Lárusson, Hafström
and Wessén 1960:463-467). This institution seems
not to have been limited to those of Nordic descent
and legal culture, but there seem to have been corresponding
possibilities of coming to a peace agreement
even when non-Scandinavians were involved
(Müller-Boysen 1990:89–91). Again, there existed
the possibility of withdrawing to a place where the
peace was guaranteed for other reasons before conducting
business. Markets, for instance, tended to
spring up in the vicinity of the assembly areas of the
Thing or at religious sites, where all persons were required
to behave peaceably (cf. Heimskringla - Óláfs
saga helga chapter 77:109; Laxdoela saga chapter
12:22).
Private-order institutions were not the only alternative
open to long-distance traders hoping to
establish a framework of security for commerce.
Northern European territorial lords also made efforts
to protect commerce and trade within their
dominions. The earliest written sources, dating from
the 9th century, spotlight how fiscally beneficial
flourishing trade could be for a territorial lord (Annales
regni Francorum a. 808:126). That was surely
the crucial inducement for lords to take measures to
protect merchants, measures that I feel quite justified
in regarding as instruments of economic policy
(Müller-Boysen 2007:180).
These protective measures could take the form of
assuring individual merchants of personal royal protection.
Such a policy entailed the consequence, of
course, that should such a person be injured or killed,
the crown would act in the interest of the victim, demanding
compensation or imposing penalties.
There are some indications that Scandinavian
kings entered into commercial partnerships with
merchants, founding joint-stock companies (Heimskringla
- Prologus:6–7, Óláfs saga helga, chapter
66:83–84, chapter 133:227–229). One is justified in
viewing these partnerships as a potent form of commercial
protection, since the merchant in question
possessed a partner who had much more impressive
means at his disposal to defend and further the
common interests of the firm than did a partnership
comprised of just 2 merchants alone.
Other measures can be viewed as active attempts
to ensure law and order. A territorial lord might, for
instance, impose a market peace on places where
trading was conducted and enforce it, in particular
by appointing a market reeve, empowered to enforce
law and order in his name. Officials called comes or
praefectus vici were demonstrably active in the early
medieval emporia Birka and Haithabu; since they
possessed coercive powers (Rimbert chapter 11:32–
33, chapter 19:39–42, chapter 31:63), it is likely that
they enforced law and order in the market place. In
addition, territorial lords at times proclaimed a guarantee
of security for all peaceable merchants, be it
for a part (Annales Fuldenses a. 873:78) or for the
whole of their dominions.
Finally, combatting robbers and plunderers,
particularly Vikings, can only be seen as an active
attempt to ensure law and order, one which redounded
to the advantage of merchants. Such measures
ranged from the interdiction of undertaking a Viking
expedition from the territory of the lord (Annales
Bertiniani a. 836:12, a. 838:16) to punishing thieves
Journal of the North Atlantic
C. Müller-Boysen
2017 Special Volume 8
213
and robbers among the lord’s own subjects (Orkneyinga
saga chapter 4:7–8; Heimskringla - Hákonar
saga góða chapter 7:120–121, chapter 8:158–160;
Helmold von Bosau chapter 49:96–97).
The earthworks which enclose Haithabu on the
leeward side bear witness to the massive effort
undertaken to defend this emporium and to protect
merchants and commerce Müller-Boysen (1990:99–
105). It is inconceivable that such a massive bastion
could have been built by anyone other than the Danish
king. Only a monarch would have it in his power
to coordinate the labor necessary to construct it and
keep the workers sheltered and fed. Moreover, the
written sources tell us that the king was very much
interested in enhancing his income from customs
and excise (Annales regni Francorum a. 808:126).
Fortifications designed to protect trade existed in
many forms. Aside from erecting earthworks around
a settlement, one could fortify a hilltop or some
other defensible place, providing the populace with
a place of refuge in case of attack, to which merchants
could also repair with their goods. To protect
settlements against attack from the sea or navigable
rivers, barricades could be erected which governed
the approaches. Finally, one could mount sentries to
keep watch and give warning—with signal fires, for
instance—of the approach of hostile forces (Orkneyinga
saga chapter 66:149, Heimskringla - Hákonar
saga góða chapter 20:176).
Commercial Law
The first step of territorial lords towards providing
legal protection to merchants was to guarantee
them a special legal status designed to cater to their
needs when they were on the move or to create a
local jurisdiction which takes account of the interests
of foreign merchants in the settlements where
they pursued their business, e.g., a Bjarkey law (cf.
Wessén 1956:655–658). A first example of this is a
privilege with which Olav the Saint at the beginning
of the 11th century gave special rights to Icelanders
who were staying in Norway (Diplomatarium
Islandicum I No. 21:64–66; cf. Norges gamle love
indtil 1387:437–438). There were several aspects:
• a legal status which gave foreign merchants
equal standing in court or possibly
even superior status,
• regulations designed to secure a deceased
merchant’s goods for his heirs,3
• a guarantee of freedom of movement, and
• freedom from oppressive customs and
duties.4
The security of contracts was, of course, important
for every merchant. He had to be certain that any
contracts he entered into would be fulfilled and that
sales contracts would not be cancelled subsequently.
Records of medieval Scandinavian law contain 2
fully developed institutions that might well be interpreted
as manifesting the desire to provide for the
sanctity of contracts.
First, the legal framework of commercial partnerships
in the High Middle Ages was not limited to the
structures discussed above, which forsaw that either
both merchants would trade together or that only the
active partner would (Amira 1882, Lehmann 1908,
Pappenheim 1889), but there was also a third structure,
in which a merchant would consign his goods
to a travelling merchant for sale (Jónsbók IX:§§
22–23, Magnus Hakonarsons By-Lov IX:§§ 21–22).
Note that at the very moment when these structures
were given legal form in written law they could look
back on a long tradition documented in inscriptions
on runic stones (Ruprecht 1958:69–71,186; Müller-
Boysen 1990:129–130).
A second element of commercial law, which was
remarkably detailed for its time, was comprised
of the rules governing the sworn association of all
those aboard a ship (Müller-Boysen 1990:136–145,
Pappenheim 1930). This shipboard association consisted
of the ship’s owner and the merchants travelling
along. All these persons had a dual function as
freighters of the ship and as its crew. Among other
duties, they were obliged to take an active part in
defending the vessel if it came under attack. Once
the oath was sworn, binding skipper and merchants
alike, the ship’s owner relinquished his exclusive
control over the ship and was duty bound to bow to
the collective will of the other members on all matters
concerning the voyage (loading and unloading,
route, etc.). The duties of the merchants on board
towards the skipper extended beyond the duration of
the voyage, in particular when called upon for assistance.
Conflicts aboard the ship could be settled internally,
and the shipboard association would punish
any legal injury inflicted on it. Once the ship reached
port, of course, the merchants competed with one
another for trade, although it was expected that they
would not attempt to disadvantage one another.
Conclusion
It goes without saying that any attempt to portray
the measures undertaken to protect trade and traders
in early medieval Northern Europe will have numerous
gaps. Nonetheless, the very first sources which
detail the activities of Scandinavian monarchs reveal
that they were very interested indeed in promoting
trade and were ready and willing to take measures
to further the security of commerce. Developments
following the end of the Age of the Vikings
Journal of the North Atlantic
C. Müller-Boysen
2017 Special Volume 8
214
demonstrate that a considerable variety of steps were
undertaken to provide the world of commerce with
sufficient security for the conduct of business. The
commercial flowering of early medieval Northern
Europe, which contrived to supply native and foreign
goods to a substantial portion of the populace
and to connect the Orient with the West, can only
be understood as the result of the success of longdistance
merchants in developing and utilizing various
forms of self-protection and of territorial lords
in removing barriers to trade and providing security
and legal protection to merchants within their dominions.
These measures allowed trade to flow in
orderly, secure channels, to the greater profit of all
participants.
Literature Cited
Primary Sources
Annales Bertiniani. G. Waitz (Ed.). Monumenta Germaniae
Historica. SS rer. Germ.V. Hannover, Germany.
Annales Fuldenses. F. Kurze (Ed.). Monumenta Germaniae
Historica. SS rer. Germ.VII. Hannover, Germany.
Annales regni Francorum. F. Kurze (Ed.). Monumenta
Germaniae Historica. SS rer. Germ.VI. Hannover,
Germany.
Diplomatarium Islandicum. Íslenzkt fornbréfasafn […]
Bd. I 834-1264. Kaupmannahöfn, Reykjavík, Iceland.
Grágás. Islændernes Lovbog i Fristatens Tid […]. V. Finsen
(Ed.). Kjøbenhavn, Denmark.
Heimskringla. B. Aðalbjarnarson (Ed.). Íslenzk Fornrit
XXVI-XXVIII. Reykjavík, Iceland.
Helmold von Bosau. Chronica Slavorum. B. Schmeidler
(Ed.). Monumenta Germaniae Historica. SS rer. Germ.
XXXII. Hannover, Germany.
Jónsbók. Kong Magnus Haakonssons Lovbog for Island
[…]. Ó. Haldórsson (Ed.). Odense, Denmark.
Konungs skuggsjá. Speculum regale. Kjøbenhavn, Denmark.
[Magnus Hakonarsons By-Lov] Den nyere By-Lov eller
Bjarkö-Ret, udgiven af Kong Magnus Haakonssön. Pp.
179–290, In R. Keyser and P.A. Munch (Eds.).Norges
gamle love II. Christiania, Norway.
Norges gamle love indtil 1387. R. Keyser and P. A. Munch
(Eds.). Christiania, Norway.
Laxdoela saga. E. Ó. Sveinsson (Ed.). Íslenzk Fornrit V.
Reykjavík, Iceland.
Orkneyinga saga. F. Guðmundsson (Ed.). Íslenzk Fornrit
XXXIV, Reykjavík, Iceland.
Rimbert. Vita Anskarii. G. Waitz (Ed.). Monumenta
Germaniae Historica. SS rer. Germ. LV. Hannover,
Germany.
Slesvig stadsret [ca. 1200–1250]. Text I. Latinsk text. Pp.
3–17, In E. Kroman and P. Jørgensen (Eds.). Danmarks
Gamle Købstadlovgivning I. København, Denmark.
Vapnfirðinga saga. Pp. 23–65, In J. Jóhannesson (Ed.).
Austfirðinga sǫgur. Íslenzk Fornrit IX. Reykjavík,
Iceland.
Secondary Sources
Amira, K. v. 1882. Altnordisches Obligationenrecht. Vol.
1. Veit and comp., Leipzig, Germany. 1752 pp.
Anz, C. 1998. Gilden im mittelalterlichen Skandinavien.
Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte
139. Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Göttingen,
Germany. 326 pp.
Anz, C. 2002. Gildernes form und funksjon in meddelalderens
Skandinavia. Pp. 21–40, In Bisgaard L. and
L. Søndergaard (Eds.) Gilder, lav og broderskaber
i middelalderens Danmark. University of Southern
Denmark Studies in History and Social Sciences Vol.
247. Syddansk Universitetsforlag. Odense, Denmark.
394 pp.
Bisgaard, L., and L. Søndergaard (Eds.) 2002. Gilder, lav
og broderskaber i middelalderens Danmark. University
of Southern Denmark Studies in History and Social
Sciences Vol. 247. Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
Odense, Denmark. 394 pp.
Bugge, A. 1913. Altschwedische Gilden. Neuere Arbeiten
über schwedische Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte.
Vierteljahreschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte
11:129–156.
Bøe, A., M.M. Lárusson, G. Hafström, and E. Wessén
1960. Grið. Pp. 463–467, In KLNM V. Kulturhistorisk
Leksikon for nordisk middelalder fra vikingetid til
reformationstid 1956–1978. Rosenkilde og Bagger,
København, Denmark. Vol I–XXII.
Christensen, A.E. 1966. Birka uden frisere. Pp. 17–38,
In Årbog 1966. Udgivet af Selskabet Handels- og Søfartsmuseets
Venner, Helsingør, Denmark.
Iuul, S. 1956. Arvekøb. Pp. 257–258, In Kulturhistorisk
Leksikon for nordisk middelalder fra vikingetid til
reformationstid 1956–1978. Vol. I. Rosenkilde og
Bagger, København, Denmark.
Lehmann, K. 1893. Kauffriede und Friedensschild. Pp.
47–64, In Germanistische Abhandlungen zum LXX.
Geburtstag Konrad von Maurers. Dieterich, Göttingen,
Germany.
Lehmann, K. 1908. Altnordische und hanseatische
Handelsgesellschaften. Zeitschrift für das gesamte
Handelsrecht 62:289–327.
Müller-Boysen, C. 1987. Stundum í víking, en stundum í
kaupferðum. Die Rolle der Wikinger im Wirtschaftsleben
des mittelalterlichen Europa. Offa 44:249–260.
Müller-Boysen, C. 1990. Kaufmannsschutz und
Handelsrecht im frühmittelalterlichen Nordeuropa.
Wacholtz, Neumünster, Germany. 168 pp.
Müller-Boysen, C. 1997. Her hæfiazc upp farmanna logh.
Kaufmannsrecht im frühmittelalterlichen Nordeuropa.
Pp. 87–102, In A. Dybdahl and J. Sandnes (Eds.). Nordiske
middelalderlover. Tekst og kontekst. Rapport
fra seminar ved Senter for middelal-derstudier 29–30.
Nov. 1996. Senter for middelalderstudier. Skrifter Nr.
5. Tapir, Trondheim, Norway.
Müller-Boysen, C. 2007. Economic policy, prosperity and
professional trader. Pp. 180–183, In J. Bately and A.
Englert (Eds.). Ohthere's Voyages: A Late 9th-Century
Account of Voyages Along the Coasts of Norway and
Denmark and its Cultural Context. Maritime Culture
of the North 1. Viking Ship Museum, Roskilde, Denmark.
Journal of the North Atlantic
C. Müller-Boysen
2017 Special Volume 8
215
Pappenheim, M. 1889. Altnordische Handelsgesellschaften.
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht
36:85–123.
Pappenheim, M. 1930. Stýrimenn und hásetar im älteren
westnordischen Schiffahrtsrecht. Pp. 246–282, In
W. Vogt (Ed.). Deutsche Islandforschung 1: Kultur.
Veröffentlichungen der Schleswig-Holsteinischen
Universititätsgesellschaft 28. Hirt, Breslau, Germany.
Ruprecht, A. 1958. Die ausgehende Wikingerzeit im Lichte
der Runeninschriften. Palaestra 224. Vandenhoeck
and Ruprecht, Göttingen, Germany. 188 pp.
Seip, D.A. 1960. Gildeskråer. Norge. Pp. 320–321. In
Kulturhistorisk Leksikon for nordisk middelalder
fra vikingetid til reformationstid 1956–1978. Vol. V.
Rosenkilde og Bagger, København, Denmark.
Wessén, E. 1956. Bjärköarätt. Pp. 655–658, In Kulturhistorisk
Leksikon for nordisk middelalder fra vikingetid
til reformationstid 1956–1978. Vol. I. Rosenkilde og
Bagger, København, Denmark.
Endnotes
1On the historical classification of the Viking Age and on
the relationship between trade and robbery in this period,
see Müller-Boysen (1987).
2For an analysis of the evidentiary value of the commercial
regulations in early medieval Northern European law
codes, see Müller-Boysen (1997:87–102).
3In Denmark, merchants were able to protect themselves
against the payment of a trade levy from the fact that their
inheritance fell to the crown in the event of death, cf. Iuul
(1956:257–258).
4For a conspectus of the relevant legal precepts, see
Müller-Boysen (1990:109–115).