Journal of the North Atlantic
N. Lynnerup
2014 Special Volume X
1
Introduction
According to the Icelandic Sagas, Eric the Red
founded the Greenlandic Norse settlement in the
year AD 986 (Jones 1986). This first settlement (the
Eastern Settlement) was augmented with another
settlement (the Western Settlement), situated about
400 km to the north of the first one. The land was uninhabited,
as the Thule Eskimos had not yet spread
to the southwestern part of Greenland. A measure of
the prosperity and the obvious steady contact with
Iceland, and thereby Norway, was the ordination
of a bishop to Gardar in the Eastern settlement in
AD 1124 (Arneborg 1991). It seems, however, that
contact with Iceland and Norway gradually faded,
although the settlements were subjected to the Norwegian
crown in AD 1261. According to written
sources, the Western Settlement had become deserted
by approximately AD 1360, and the last known
written testimony from the Eastern Settlement dates
to AD 1408 (Grønlands Historiske Mindesmærker
III:145–150). It has been assumed that the Eastern
settlement was finally depopulated a century later
(Meldgaard 1965).
The Big Picture
Various explanations on the demise of the
Norse settlements very much hinge upon how
big the population was. If it was small, then even
slight perturbations may rapidly have brought the
population below sustainable levels, whereas a
large population would have a better “buffering”
effect. Estimating the population size may be done
by, for example, analyzing the number and size of
those churchyard sites that have been thoroughly
excavated, and then calculating an average burial
density. It is then possible to extrapolate from
the known churchyard areas to a total inhumed
population, which indicates an average population
of some 1500–2000 people (Lynnerup 1998).
Another way to evaluate population size would
be to look at the biological framework for such a
population. Was an increase from a starting population
of 400–500 individuals to at least 2000 individuals
possible within a 300-year period, without having
to assume extreme values for life span, mortality,
and fertility? And, consequently, could a population
of this size pass into extinction?
I arbitrarily set a starting population at 500 individuals
based on historical research, drawing on
information in the accounts in the Grønlændingesaga
and Eric the Red’s Saga that “32 ships sailed
for Greenland ... but only 14 made it there” (GHM
I: 179, 207). It has been estimated that some of the
larger Viking cargo ships of the period 1000 AD
had a cargo capacity of 40 tons (Crumlin-Pedersen
et al. 1992), allowing for a capacity of about 30
individuals per ship. Consequently, about 300–400
people could have settled in Greenland in the first
wave (Meldgaard 1965). Keller has mentioned that
the capacity of the ships may have been smaller, but
that there was more regular immigration, leading
to a starting population of about 300–800 people
(Keller 1986). A minimum starting population of
some 500 people would fit with the generally accepted
minimum levels for sustainable populations
of about 400–500 (Dyke 1984, Geist 1978). Using
an exponential model, a rate of increase of 0.62%
would have to be assumed for the population level
to increase to about 2000 within about 200 years.
Endperiod demographics of the Greenland Norse
Niels Lynnerup*
Abstract - The Norse who settled and lived in Greenland AD 1000–1500 provide a unique biological anthropological material
for the investigation of human and environmental interaction. They were a relatively isolated population, constrained
in both space and time. This study reports on demographic modelling of (1) marriage and fertility patterns and (2) total
population level numbers with crude death rates and birth rates, including immigration and emigration scenarios. In addition
to linear models, I also used stochastic models, which may be especially important when dealing with small populations.
My results indicate that a small population such as the Norse inevitably will be close to a minimum sustainable level, and
that simple emigration may explain the demise of the settlements. Furthermore, when the societal and economical implications
of the population dynamics are considered, certain activities of the Norse in the latter phase of the settlement, such
as the building of new churches, may acquire a new significance. To illustrate this, a so-called sunk-cost economic model
was applied.
Viking Settlers of the North Atlantic: An Isotopic Approach
Journal of the North Atlantic
*Laboratory of Biological Anthropology, The Panum Institute, Blegdamsvej 3, DK-2200 N Copenhagen, Denmark;
n.lynnerup@antrolab.ku.dk.
2014 Special Volume X:XX–XX
Journal of the North Atlantic
N. Lynnerup
2014 Special Volume X
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This rate does in fact parallel a calculated population
increase in Iceland for the period 970–1095 AD,
using population figures from Thorarinsson (1961),
and corresponds also to rates calculated for many
other populations reported in ethnographic studies
(between 0.05% and 0.59%; Hassan 1981:234). Indeed,
recently, the peopling of Iceland has been proposed
to take place over just 20 years (although with
continuing “reinforcements”), basically going from
none to more 20,000 (Vesteinsson and McGovern
2012). Although different numbers and circumstances
apply, the pattern would probably be identical
for Iceland and Greenland: a first phase with rapid
peopling, followed by a longer-term, continuous
but less-numerous immigration. For Greenland, the
immigration rate probably dropped to zero (or rather
the net rate of immigration and emigration was
zero) over the years 1100–1200 AD. This reduction,
along with a slowing of population increase (as the
population approached carrying capacity and thus
began to strain resources), could be consistent with
a levelling-out by 1200 AD. It would be difficult
to precisely set a definite carrying capacity, as the
carrying capacity depends on general climatic environmental
factors as well as the energy-extraction
technology. However, it is generally assumed that
the climate was favorable in the beginning of the
settlement period, but then deteriorated throughout
the period with the so-called Little Ice Age, as first
demonstrated by Dansgaard et al. (1975). In fact, it
has been possible to also demonstrate a changing climate
directly in the dental enamel of the Norse and
Thule Culture Eskimos (Fricke et al. 1995). Recent
comprehensive stable isotope analyses of the Norse
point to an increasing reliance on marine foodstuffs,
reflecting the terrestrial carrying capacity was being
reached (Arneborg et al. 2012a).
But can the Greenland Norse be considered to
have gone extinct? Given a positive growth rate,
emigration remains a possible explanation of a decreasing
population. Emigration may occur when a
population exceeds its optimum level in relation to
living conditions (Hassan 1981). This scenario could
have occurred because the Norse population reached
the carrying capacity of their habitat, which may in
fact itself have been decreasing, at least as concerns
farming. Cultural identity probably also played a
strong role: the Norse saw themselves as farmers,
and having livestock was important in this respect,
as was also probably a sense of wanting to be part of
the wider Norse North Atlantic “sphere” with regular
contact and trade (Arneborg et al. 2012a). Allowing
for a decreasing rate of growth (as especially young
people tend to emigrate, thereby not only counting
themselves out of the population but also removing
their potential offspring), the emigration rate would
have had to have been about 8 individuals per year.
For a small population like the Norse, such a level of
emigration would certainly have had a dramatic effect.
The question is whether such rates are realistic,
keeping in mind that these rates represent averages.
In other words, emigration would probably have taken
place in waves of, for example, 100 people (i.e.,
three boats) every ten years.
The size difference between the Western and
Eastern Settlements must also be taken into account.
Judging by the numbers of farmhouses (West: 80,
East: 250; Gad 1984) and by the number of churches
(West: 3, East: 11), there seems to be a 1:3 ratio
between the settlement population sizes. Viewed in
isolation, the Western Settlement would rapidly approach
the minimum population size of 500. Indeed,
given the above emigration rates and lowered fertility
rates, the population would have fallen below
this level after just 20 years. It is thus possible that
a decline began at around AD 1300, and that approximately
50 years later, most people would have
had emigrated from the Western Settlement, leaving
perhaps only a few, mainly elderly, settlers. The
Western Settlement could thus have been completely
depopulated during the 14th century. Perhaps the
Eastern Settlement then experienced some immigration,
which for some years offset the rate of decline,
but then decline proceeded at the same rate as in
the Western Settlement. This scenario would leave
the Eastern Settlement depopulated in the mid-15th
century.
A population may also become extinct due to exceptionally
high mortality rates. High mortality rates
are usually linked with war and epidemics. However,
even rates of up to 10% of young adults killed in
warfare would not substantially decrease birth rates.
Thus, highly lethal epidemics are the only probable
cause of a dramatic reduction due to mortality
in the population within a short time span. Plague
struck both Iceland and Norway in the 14th and 15th
centuries, and total mortality rates of between 30%
and 50% have been suggested (Benedictow 1992).
Clearly, a halving of the Norse population in just
one or two years would be disastrous for such a
small population, and on the basis of the numbers
alone could quite plausibly explain the population
reduction. There is no historical evidence of plague
in Greenland, and plague is a disease that does not
leave any signs in the skeleton. While a few multiple
synchronic graves have been found, most recently at
Ø64 (J. Arneborg, Danish National Museum, Copenhagen,
Denmark, pers. comm.), such burials do not
Journal of the North Atlantic
N. Lynnerup
2014 Special Volume X
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point to plague as such, and certainly not anything
resembling the plague pits of European cemeteries at
the time of the great plague epidemics.
Based on the above, a bigger picture emerges, allowing
for an accumulated population size of 26,500
for the total period of Norse presence in Greenland,
equivalent to an average population size Nc of 1377
at any one time. These figures are very close to the
figures arrived at in the preceding section, based on
the number of interments in cemeteries. These figures
highlight that the Norse population could very
well have reached reasonable levels and conversely
pass into extinction within the 500-year span of
Norse settlement, without assuming undue biological
parameters either for immigration and fertility,
or emigration and mortality. Such a hypothetical
population “profile” is shown in Figure. 1.
The Smaller Picture
The above demographic model is based on linear
models. Thus, the population model is at best
a grand average. While the overall model may
reflect real changes, no real population behaves as
“smoothly” as linear models. Real-life populations
have a much more “rugged” pattern, i.e., small
fluctuations due to deaths and births not occurring
at regular intervals (so-called stochastic variation).
This discrepancy is not a problem for such general
models as the fluctuations will tend to even out. Yet,
it may be of great importance for small populations;
once the population is sufficiently small it becomes
vulnerable to fluctuations in fertility and mortality
(Weiss and Smouse 1976). The Norse population
was small, and therefore the occurrence of births
and deaths may not even out. In terms of sustaining
the population level, the number of girls born is
especially important. Assuming, as is often done for
medieval populations (Hassan 1981), a gross child
mortality rate (i.e., up to adulthood) of 50%, then
each woman would have to give birth to two girls in
order for one of them to reach fertile age and have
children (thus keeping the population level steady).
In a small population such as the Western Settlement,
there might only be 15 to 20 births a year,
corresponding to 7–10 girls, of which maybe 3–5
survived childhood. If for some reason even more
of the small children and newborns die due to, e.g.,
an infectious disease, food poisoning, etc., this may
mean that the entire replacement stock of girls that
year are removed. The population as a whole would
in that case be severely challenged to keep up its
number. There would simply not be enough females
to give birth to enough children for the population
to be sustainable. A bigger population may buffer
this, but for small populations this can have severe
downstream demographic implications.
Figure 2 shows a simple stochastic modelling,
where a computer randomly selects a birth or a
Figure 1. Population profile of the Norse settlements in
Greenland. Upper curve is for the total population (East
and West Settlements); middle curve East Settlement
only; lower curve West settlement only. The curves chart
a course of population development from ~500 settlers,
reaching a peak level of ~2000 individuals, and then, inside
200 years, a decline to 0. Note that the West settlement
is the smallest settlement, thus the one most vulnerable to
stochastic changes and the first to collapse (see text and
Fig. 2).
Figure 2. Simple stochastic modelling, where a computer
randomly selects a birth or a death. Purely by chance such
a “run” may be rather steady (“I”: deaths more or less
equal births) or show a decrease (“II”: more deaths than
births). Such random developments may have big implications
for small populations.
Journal of the North Atlantic
N. Lynnerup
2014 Special Volume X
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death. Purely by chance, such a “run” may be rather
steady (deaths more or less equal births) or show a
decrease (more deaths than births) or show an increase
(more births than deaths).
Further mathematical analysis concerning the
West Settlement suggests that a decline in the sex
ratio (fewer females as to males) may very well
have been the case, with the total population number
falling below 50 well within the attested timeframe
of Norse settlement (Di Bacco et al. 2006). These
calculations were based on finds at the churchyard
at W51 Sandnes, where the skeletal material dates to
around the 12th century (Arneborg et al. 2012b), and
is thus not a reflection of, e.g., an earlier “founder”
population, where one might perhaps suppose there
was a skew towards males.
Societal Changes
If the Norse were facing an ever more arduous
and difficult life in Greenland, then why are the historical
and archaeological sources silent about what
happened? If people left, why is there no incontrovertible
evidence for this, e.g., in terms of evidence
such as the Sagas telling about the Landnam period?
Intriguingly, there is a complete absence of rich finds
from Greenlandic Norse settlements. No church
inventory, weapons, objects of fine metals such as
jewellery has been found among the Norse settlements
(Berglund 1986). Indeed, this might point to
the very fact of a gradual, depopulation. When you
leave, you take along your valuables. However, other
archaeologists have pointed to churches, which
seemingly were built almost up to the demise of the
settlements. If the Norse were leaving, then why invest
labor in building new churches? Would this not
rather point to a sudden and disastrous demise?
The latter question touches upon a very fundamental
question of how past populations “fail”, and
how this is perceived in the archaeological record. I
have tentatively applied the “sunk-cost” model, as
proposed by Janssen et al. (2003). In brief, this model
first states that past societies (or recent for that matter)
will balance between “recovery” and “collapse”
periods. Depending on the size, ecology, economy,
and other parameters, each society may possess a
high or low buffering capacity or resilience. Thus, a
society where surplus is generated may weather a period
of, for instance, crop failure for a certain period
of time. The Norse society, being small, and probably
under climatic stress, would have a small buffering
capacity and low resilience. That is, maybe just a few
years of poor or failed crops, disease among the livestock,
etc., may have driven the society past a demographic
and social tipping point, so that it collapses
without being able to recover.
Furthermore, the model states that human investment
in societal matters is not always rational. For
example, the Norse in the Eastern Settlement established
water canals to sustain grazing land. This
is an example of a clearly rational investment. On
the other hand, more irrational investments may be
made (or, and this must be emphasized, irrational to
us), such as building a new church. But it is not so
much a question of whether the Norse or modern researchers
studying them define an investment as rational
or irrational, nor whether such activity may be
deemed “wasteful”, following Dunnell (1999), i.e.,
activity not directly related to immediate welfare or
reproduction. The central issue in the “sunk cost”
model is that once an investment is made, then it is
very difficult to change it. Indeed, the investment
might “take a life of its own”, with ever increasing
investments, because the object of investment may
become a symbol for the society, something which
binds the society together or shows defiance in the
face of adversity. The investment seemingly offsets
collapse; it may even in the archaeological record
look as if the society is capable of, e.g., constructing
huge and magnificent buildings, but in an economic
reality, the society is collapsing. And when it collapses,
it looks all the more sudden (Janssen et al.
2003).
To put this model in a Norse perspective, one
could envision the following scenario. Adversity hits
first the Western Settlement, the smallest and most
challenged ecologically/economically. Some leave,
but others show defiance, perhaps hoping that things
will reverse. As a (for them) rational investment, a
new church is erected; perhaps a new church showing
the devoutness of the people, which will appease
God. Building a new church is a big investment, and
to perhaps abandon it half-finished would be a sign
of weakness or lack of faith. Thus the church gets
built, even though more people leave, and the general
situation is ever more bleak. Finally the church
is finished, but only few years later, the settlement
collapses completely, leaving perhaps only a few elderly
people on their farmsteads. In other words, collapse
started early, and the overall societal activity
was in steady decline. Yet for the archaeologists finding
a new church, it may seem that decline only set in
late (Fig. 3). In other words, the Norse settlements in
Greenland experienced a steady decline over 100–
200 years, not a sudden collapse, even though investments
such as a new church, were being made right
to the end. I feel that the “sunk cost” model, coupled
with archaeological and anthropological data holds
potential for future investigations. New buildings,
big investments, are not necessarily evidence of a
society far from collapse.
Journal of the North Atlantic
N. Lynnerup
2014 Special Volume X
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Conclusion
Ultimately, the demise of the Norse settlements
was not something out of the ordinary. In fact, there
seems to have been a massive depopulation in most
European countries at that same time. As mentioned
earlier, a 60% decrease in population has been
projected for northern Norway, and at least a 30%
decrease for Iceland. This massive depopulation,
usually ascribed to the great plague epidemics,
had enormous demographic, economic, and social
repercussions throughout the wider social and demographic
networks of Europe and the North Atlantic
region. In the wake of the plague, there was largescale
population resettlement, where inhabitants
of the more unproductive areas left for the better,
“vacant” zones. Whether Norse Greenland was directly
affected by plague or not, it would, as a highly
peripheral area, most certainly have been affected
by the indirect effects of plague. For instance, the
export prices of several Icelandic commodities fell
dramatically (Keller 1986), and this may well have
had economic consequences for Greenland (Arneborg
et al. 2012a). Since it seems that the decline in
population levels in fact had already started before
the plague epidemics reached the northern European
countries, and we can assume from palaeoclimatic
and archaeozoological evidence that there was climatic
change in the years after 1300 AD, this shift
likely “stressed” the population (Brothwell 1998),
probably resulting in a trend towards ever harsher
living conditions. Adaptive responses would include
increasing marine foodstuff reliance and seeking to
increase land yield; the former evidenced by the stable
isotope analyses, and the latter perhaps reflected
by irrigation systems and the buffering capacity of
the local community, headed by large farmsteads
(Arneborg et al. 2012a).
However, perhaps after some internal resettlement,
emigration accelerated in the 15th century.
Better land became available in a larger community,
e.g., Iceland, and it is even possible that old family
claims could be invoked (e.g., Halstead and O’Shea
1989). The marginal land of Greenland no longer
held the same attraction.
If correct, the scenario sketched out here would
also serve to eliminate some of the “spectacularity”
of the demise of the settlement. The Norsemen
moved to Greenland because of a perceived gain
and the possibility of owning land, perhaps pushed
to some extent by population pressure and the rapid
exploitation of Iceland (Anthony 1990, 1997). They
Figure 3. Model of the Norse collapse. The minimum level of societal sustenance is the (not well-defined) level at which a
society irreversibly breaks down (dashed line). The black line indicates that the society was over many years in continuing
decline (“what really happened”). The dotted line shows that the societal activity may have seemed to be not in declince,
e.g., due to building of a new church (“what the archaeologists see”). Yet the building of a new church did nothing to change
the fundamental decline, it only offset the rate of final collapse; thus, the demise of the Norse settlements may seem sudden,
but in reality the decline was ongoing.
Journal of the North Atlantic
N. Lynnerup
2014 Special Volume X
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moved back when this possibility arose again in Iceland.
Indeed, it would be surprising, in the light of
the almost universal demographic changes and overall
depopulation in Norway, Iceland, England, etc.
(see, for example, Holopainen and Helama 2009,
Lagerås 2007), if a remote and already economically
vulnerable settlement like the Norse settlement in
Greenland did not decline.
Based on our exhaustive stable isotope study,
concerning the Norse, their domesticates, and game
(Arneborg et al. 2012a, b), we hope to be able to
carry out much more detailed analyses of the Norse
farming strategies and their use of marine foodstuffs,
in order to better calculate the carrying capacity
of the Norse settlements. These efforts in turn
may then allow for a higher-resolution demographic
modelling.
As such, the Norse case study may apply to
other small and isolated populations in the past.
It has been suggested that regional extinction and
re-colonization can explain many patterns in the
archaeological record of the Pleistocene (Premo and
Kuhn 2010, Riede 2009), but perhaps also Neolithic
settlements should be seen in this light, if even the
relatively advanced agricultural populations of the
medieval period were prone to stochastically caused
demographic collapse following the relatively minor
climatic changes of that period.
Author’s Note
This paper is based on my previous publication: Lynnerup,
N. 2011. When populations decline: Endperiod
demographics and economics of the Greenland Norse.
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